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Abstract

The need to balance the needs and rights of all parties is a central consideration in
legal procedure. This is no simple task, however, when the interests of the defendant are
often in direct contrast to those of the witness. Much of the contention arises from the

ambiguity associated with the nature ofboth victims' and defendants' rights and the lack

of clear guidelines for the resolution of conflict where such competing interests are
involved. Because Australia has no document precisely delineating the nature and
content of individual rights, the result is a reliance on an ill-defined combination of
common law practice, conceptions of both natural rights and utilitarianism,
international human rights agreements and legislative stipulations.

In recent times, attention has been focused on the perceived inadequacies of
legislation pertaining to the child witness in a criminal trial. There is considerable

contemporary e:idence to suggest that the traditional justifications given to regulate the
reception of children's evidence in courts of law were based on unsubstantiated notions
of the inherent unreliability of children. The need to introduce legislative refonn
pertaining to the evidence of children was first articulated by the Child Sexual Abuse
Task Force which finalised its report to the Western Australian government in 1987. In
Aprill991, the Law Refonn Commission of Western Australia published their Report
on Evideoce of Children and Other Vulnemble Witnesses, having been asked to review
the law and pmctice governing the giving of such evidence in legal proceedings. Their
recommendations formed the basis for the Acts Amendment (Evidence ofChildren und
Others) Act 1992.

iii

Although there is widespread support for the introduction of measures to address
the needs of the child witness, there does not appear to have been sufficient rigorous
evaluation of the corresponding effect on defendants' rights, particularly the right to a
fair trial. This right, although not protected or defined by statute, is recognised both in

Australia's common law heritage and through our ratification of major international
human rights agreements. Although there is a general acceptance that the right to a fair
trial largely overrides other individual claims to rights within the trial setting, an

important consideration is the inherent vulnerability of common law rights to abrogation
or removal by statutory law. Similarly, international human rights agreements are not,

of themselves, always adequately enforceable, and require the enactment of supportive
domestic legislation to ensure that their provisions are upheld. This has not occurred in
Australia to any great extent.

The primacy of the right to a fair trial is not supported by the Acts Amer.dment
(Evidence ofChi/dren and Others Ac(! 1992. Whilst some of the provisions of this Act,

such as the amendments relating to competence and corroboration of evidence, have

.

brought children onto equal footing with other (adult) witnesses, other provisions have

encroached on the defendant's right to a fair trial. Of particular concern are the subtle
erosion of the presumption of innocence, the effects on the ability of the defence to
cross-examine witnesses effectively, and the widespread inequality which the defendant

now suffers in contrast to other defendants whose alleged offences do not come under
the auspices of the Act: Although in drafting the legislation some care was taken to
address these concerns, there still exists a degree of incompatibility between the Acts
Amendment (Evidence of Children and Others) Act 1992 and defendants' rights.

Safeguards for the protection of defendants' rights contained in the Act are, at times,

irr.;ufficient.

iv
The precise extent to which the provisions ofthe Acts Amendment (Evidence of

Children ond Others) Act 1992 encroach on the conception of trial fairness is difficult
to ascertain, thus the current research has highlighted only those provisions of the Act
which are potentially incompatible with defendants' rights. Future research must
stringently investigate the actual (not perceived) impact of these provisions on all
parties to the proceedings, including the defendan~ the child, defence and prosecution

lawyers, judicial officers and jurors. Subsequent to this investigation, a re~evaluation
of the legitimacy of the legislation may be required.
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INTRODUCTION

A central consideration in legal procedure in Western legal jurisdictions is the need
to balance the rights, responsibilities and obligations of all parties involved (Carmichael

& Sarre, 1994, p. 119; Harrison, 1992). This is surely no easy task in a criminal trial
where the interests of the defendant are often in direct competition with those of the

victim or witness. In recent years, increasing attention has focused upon the particular
needs of the child witness, culminating in a number of amendments to both the trial

process and various aspects of the law of evidence, the aim of which is to facilitate the
reception of children's evidence. Although in calling for legislative change the Law
Refonn Commission of Western Australia explicitly acknowledged the right of the
defendant to a fair trial (1991, p. 60), their assertions that the (then) proposed
amendments- which fonn the basis of the Acts Amendment (Evidence ofChildren and
Others) Act 1992 (in future, referred to as "The Act")- do not impinge on this right,

appear to require more stringent evaluation. In seeking to accommodate the needs and
rights of the child witness in a criminal trial, it is possible that the legitimate rights of
the defendant have been compromised. The Act has perceptibly shifted the balance of

competing interests in a criminal trial, and it is the redefining of the relationship
between these interests which is of concern in this thesis.

Although it was asserted in Parliament prior to the enactment of The Act that

"Particular care has also been taken in drafting the bill to ensure that accused persons
retain their rights, particularly the right to a fair trial" (Berinson, 1992, p. 15), it will be

argued that there are a number of specific concerns which have not been rigorously
evaluated. Thus the aim of this study is to investigate whether or not there exists a
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degree of incompatibility between The Act and defendants' rights. This will be achieved
by addressing the following questions:

•

What specific rights are held by the defendant in a criminal trial?

•

Are any of the provisions of the Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and
Others) Act /992 at least potentially inconsistent with the upholding of these
rig)lf~?

•

If so, how may the areas of incompatibility be resolved or, at least, minimised?

These questions will be addressed through the applicatim

.ae principles of

logical reasoning to the analysis of potential incompatibilities between The Act and
defendants' rights. The premises for this argument will be established through a detailed
examination of both the literature on rights and the law as it stands. It is reasonable to
assume, therefore, that tl1e persuasiveness of the argument will rest substantially on the
degree to which these premises may be established as true. It may be considered a
limitation that, in this purely conceptual research endeavour, undertaken in a

contentious field replete with conflicting ideas, values and opinions, 11 truth 11 may be
perceived as an elusive quality. Furthennore, logical analysis can reach conclusions that
are intuitively uncomfortable, yet, as noted by Bates ( 1992), "the very subject of child
sexual abuse has, probably inevitably, spawned entrenched and intractable points of

view which, in tum, tend to obfuscate the realities of the situation".

Background oftbe Law of Evidence

"The evidence of a fact is that which tends to prove it - something which may
satisfY an inquirer that the fact exists" (Byrne and Heydon, 1991, p. 1). Thus the law of
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evidence is the body of rules which regulates the presentation of evidence in conrts of
law, ensuring that the evidence introduced is relevant to the proof of the facts in
question. Specifically, the law of evidence governs what evidence may be presented to
the court, who may give evidence, and how the evidence may be presented. Since the

court's decision is based solely on the admitted evidence, and because any given case
may be dependent upon whether or not a particular item of evidence may be presented

to the court, it is obvious that the law of evidence is a potentially decisive factor in
determining the trial outcome.

The three main influences on the development of the law of evidence to its

contemporruy form are the jwy, the• oath
and the adversary system. Initially, juries were
>
comprised of a group of the defendant's neighbours, whose collective opinion decided

guilt or innocence. There was little or no reliance on unbiased factual evidence, with
jurymen being those who might, by virtue oftheir proximity, have some knowledge of

the event in question. Thus jurymen were also the earliest fonn of witnesses (Stone &
Wells, 1991, pp. 16-18).

The transition of the jwy from neighbours to independent individuals probably
began when more than one issue had to be decided at trial: Those neighbours who might

know of the circumstances of one issue (for example, a rape) may have no knowledge
of another (fur example, the privilege of clergy which - at that time - may have afforded

the accused exemption from prosecution). Such circumstances would, therefore, have
necessitated the fonnation of more than one jury (Stone & Wells, 1991, pp. 18-19).
Expediency gradually separated the responsibilities of witness and jury, with evidence
from witnesses being presented before an independent jury.
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An oath was originally sworn to invoke divine intervention. With the inclusion of

witnesses and the provision of evidence in trials, individuals had to swear an oath on the
Gospel, the intention being that such an oath would be binding on the individual's
conscience. Although the right to take the oath - and therefore to give evidence - was
originally limited to Christians, amendments have gradually introduced a variety of

alternatives which enable people of other religions to swear an oath in a manner
compliant with their religious beliefs (Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC],
1982, pp. 1-8). For those who hold no religious belief, evidence may be given upon
making a solemn affirmation (Evidence Act 1906 [WA], s. 7). Clearly these
developments have greatly influenced the diversity of people who are deemed

competent to give evidence at trial.

The adversary system developed from the ancient tradition of trial by battle, where
the parties to a dispute would engage in physical combat to decide the winner (and thus
the person in the right). Today the 'battle' is conducted in coutt, where both parties (or
their legal representatives) contend, puTSuant to the rules of evidence. At common law,
the parties to the dispute conduct their own case: the responsibility ofthe judge and/or
jury is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented to them - there is no

allowance made for the court to seek additional evidence. It is, however, a reasonable
assumption that those parties directly involved in the proceedings, therefore having the

greatest interest in the outcome, are most likely to identifY and present the most relevant
evidence in support of their particular claims (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 33).

There are two fundamental conceptions underpinning the law of evidence. Firstly,

a court is not to consider information or evidence unless it is probative of the material
facts; and secondly, that "unless excluded by some rule or principle oflaw, all that is

5

logically probative is admissible" (Thayer, 1898, p. 266). Evidential rules are, however,
largely rules of exclusion (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 43; Bates, 1985, p. 14) and relevant
evidence may be deemed inadmissible (Byrne & Heydon, 1986, p. 85; Cross & Wilkins,

1986). The predominant justification for such exclusions is the perceived necessity to
protect lay juries from the "dangers of confusion and prejudice" (Stone & Wells, 1991,
p. 55) associated with the reception of all but the most reliable and cogent - as well as

logically probative - evidence. The exclusion of evidence more prejudicial than
probative is, therefore, a direct acknowledgment of the right of the defendant to a fair
trial (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 49).
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION

The Traditional Approach to Children's Evidence

One area in which the rules of evidentiary exclusion have bad a substantial impact
is in respect to the evidence of children. The law has traditionally regarded children as
a special class of persons, requiring both special protective measures (for example,
freedom from criminal responsibility) and unique restrictions against their involvement
in certain activities (such as the prohibition against driving until the age of 17) 1Law
Reform Commission of Western Australia [LRCWA], 1990, p. 6). In court, childrtn
have been traditionally regarded as unreliable witnesses, and it is this notion of inherent
unreliability which was the principle justification for the established rules of
competence which, until recently, largely precluded their testimony (Warner, 1988;
1991).

At common law, there exists no fonnal test of competence to give evidence beyond
the under.;tanding of the oath (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 3~3). Although in English law it is
not necessary for a child to believe in God for him or her to be deemed able to
understand the nature of the oath, in Western Australia the common law test for
competency to take the oath had been more strictly construed than the other States, as
it incorpomted the notion of religious understanding (LRCWA, 1990, pp. 17-18). Such
stringent reliance upon the understanding of the oath is now, however, widely regarded
as both unrealistic and unfair, because it meant that if a child was unable to understand
or adequately describe the concept of divine retribution or the significance of taking an
oath on the Bible, they were unable to give evidence on oath (Byrne, 1991, p. 12). "This
is not a test which a very young child, however intelligent and truthful, may be expected
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to pass ... [nor is it] a test which, when strictly interpreted, can properly he applied to
a child who has not had any religious training" (LRCWA, 1990, p. 8).

Also at common law, there exists a requirement that a child's evidence - like that
of all other witnesses - he given on oath. Coupled with the stringent competency test,
the result was largely the exclusion of children's evidence. Gradually, however,
Australian jurisdictions, together with those of many other common law countries, have
modified this standard, allowing children to give unsworn evidence where they are
deemed unfit to take the oath (LRCWA, 1990, p. 17). The new standard for unsworn
evidence required that the court he satisfied that the child witness had the capacity to
give rational evidence, that they could demonstrate an understanding of the moral duty
to tell the truth, and they were adjudicated as being likely to tell the truth (Ligertwood,
1993, p. 363; LRCWA, 1990, p. 8). In Western Australia, this was dealt with under
section 101 of the Evidence Acti906 (since repealed) (Appendix 1).

As noted in seetion 101(2), the Evidence Ac/1906 prior to amendment contained

the express provision that no person could be convicted of a crime or misdemeanour on
the unsworn testimony of r1 child unless the testimony was corroborated by other

evidence. Corroboration is independent evidence which otherwise tends to establish that
the offi:nce in question was committed, and also that it was committed by the defendant
(Byrne & Heydon, 1991, pp. 12-13). The corroboration requirement attached to
children's evidence acted as an exception to the general rule that the uncorroborated
evidence of one witness was sufficient in order to obtain a conviction (LRCWA, 1990,
p. 19).
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At this point it may be pertinent to distinguish who precisely is considered to be a
child under Western Australian law. Although at common law those under the age of
majority (that is, 18 years) are liable to assessment for competence to take the oath,
section I0 I of the Evidence Act 1906 (since repealed) referred only to children under
the age of 12 years. For all practical purposes, therefore, children 12 years and over are
presumed competent to take the oath in the same manner as adults. Furthermore, the
corroboration requirements related to the unsworn testimony of children do not apply
to the unsworn testimony ofthose over the age of 12 years (LRCWA, 1990, pp. 6-7).

At common law, there was a rule of practice that, even when a child gives sworn
testimony, the trial judge should warn the jury that, although they may permissibly

choose to convict the accused it would be dangerous to do so in the absence of
corroborative evidence (Warner, 1991, p. 170). Thus even when permitted to give

evidence, whether by sworn or unsworn testimony, children s evidence had retained the
1

stigma of unreliability.

The Argument for Legislative Reform

The need for legislative reform in this state was first officially articulated by the
Child Sexual Abuse Task Force which finalised its report to the Western Australian
government in 1987. This Task Force recognised the need to minimise, as far as
possible, the negative impact oflegal proceedings on the child. In all, 17 of their 64
recommendations dealt with proposed amendments to legal proceedings (Manley &
Bellett, 1994).
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The Task Force concluded that ''the law regarding the evidence of children presents
difficulties in cases of child sexual abuse, since very often there is no physical evidence
of the abuse, and it is frequently difficult to present other evidence that corrobomtes a
child victim's testimony" (cited in LRCWA. 1990, p. 3). They asserted that, among the
obstacles to successful prosecution in cases of child sexual abuse, certain aspects of the
'

law of evidence were paramount.

Among their concerns were:

•

The inability to obtain a conviction on the unsworn, unsubstantiated evidence of

a child under 12 years;
•

The requirement that drildren must give evidence in open court, in the presence of

the accused; and
•

The additional requirements imposed on children, but not adults, who wish to give
unsworn testimony (that is, that they be "possessed of sufficient intelligence" to

justifY reception of the evidence-s. 101 Evidence Ac/1906).
(LRCWA, 1990, pp. 3-4).

In April1990, the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia published their

Discussion Paper on Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses, having
been asked to review the law and practice governing the giving of such evidence in legal

proceedings. They specified that the incentive for the review had arisen largely from the
growth in public awareness of, and concern about, the sexual abuse of children (p. 3).

The report drew on a growing body of psychological literature which challenged
the basic assumptions which regulated legal pmctice involving the reception of
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children's evidence. It had tmditionally been accepted that children's evidence could not
be relied upon because:

•

children have no sense of ethical responsibility and are therefore inclined to tell
lies;

•

children have difficulty differentiating reality from fantasy; and

•

children do not have adequate cogoitive skills to either understand or accurately
describe what happened
(LRCWA, 1990, p. 9).

These concerns are not validated by more recent psychological litemtore.
Contemporary evidence suggests that children are no more likely to be dishonest than
adults, and when they do tell lies, it is for the same reasons as adults - reasons which
include the avoidance of punishment or embarrassmen~ the protection of a loved one,
and as a 'social grace' (Flin & Spencer, 1995; Dixon, 1994b; Scutt, 1991). With
particular regard to child sexual abuse, it is claimed that demonstrable lying is very rare
- probably lower than for adult witnesses (Bussey, 1992, p. 69). Sexoal contact is
considered unlikely to figure in children's fantasies (LRCWA, 1990, p. 10) and,
similarly, the fabrication of sexual encounters is postulated as unlikely, because these
are believed to be beyond a child's expected levels of maturity and experience (Brennan,
1993).

There is now general agreement among child psychologists and psychiatrists that
the accumcy of recall of children is probably at least as good as that of adults, although
older children and adults will remember for longer and in more detail (LRCWA, 1990,
p. 10; Foulsham, 1991, p. 215; Davies & Brown, 1978). The age effects are most
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noticeable when the memory test is free recall rather than prompted recall (Flin &
Spencer, 1995, p. 179), which has resulted in suggestions that the types of questions
asked of child witnesses, and the form of testimony required of them, is a more
important consideration in terms of the quality of their evidence than is the issue of
memory itself. Thus it has been asserted that judges, magistrates, lawyers and police
prosecutors involved in cases involving child witnesses should receive special training
in the social, physiological and cognitive development of children (Scudds, 1991, p. 87),
even to the point of developing a legal subspecialty in this area (Oates and Tong, 1987).
If, as has been suggested (Warner, 1991, p. 170), even young children are able to
provide reliable testimony if questions are appropriately tailored to their level of
cognitive development, then greater understanding of the strengths and weakoesses of
children's intellectual abilities "should assist the interviewers in adopting an effective
technique- one which will enable the child to share their memories without diminishing
the evidential value of the interview" (Flin & Spencer, 1995, p. 186).

In light of these developments, the corroboration requirement imposed on the
testimony of younger children must be viewed as indicative of the basic distrust with
which the court regards all unsworn evidence - but more particularly that of a child. An
important result of this distrllst is a general belief that corroborative evidence cannot
take the form of further (independent) unsworn testimony. The consequence of this
belief is "that, even in a case where there may be a large number of witnesses, if those
witnesses are all children judged unable to take the oath ... then no conviction will
follow unless there is other independent sworn evidence implicating the alleged
offender" (LRCWA, 1990, pp. 8-9). The apparently consistent recall of a number of
children is considered to be no different than one child's recollection.
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This is particularly pertinent when you ccnsider that children are most often called

to give evidence with regard to their own experience as victims (ALRC, 1992, p. !).In

cases of child sexual abuse, for example, the corrobomtion requirement has been
described as presenting a "formidable" (Davies, 1993, p. 284), if not virtually
"insurmountable" (Scutt, 1991, p. 130) difficulty for successful prosecution. Abusive
acts are frequently conducted in private with no witnesses other than the victim, leave
no medical evidence or produce inconclusive clinical findings, and the alleged
perpetrator denies any wrongdoing (Davies, 1993, p. 284; Harrison, 1992, p. 30; Scutt,
1991, p. 130). Thus, if corroborative evidence was not available, legal proceedings were
rarely commenced (Warner, 1991, p. 171). Because of this," ... it is argued that a
corroboration requirement unduly discriminates against the testimony of children and
thereby effectively prevents the conviction of persons who have committed offences
against children" (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 360).

This is obviously far from ideal. Although it is unacceptable in light of current
knowledge to brand children's evidence inherently unreliable, however, it is equally
unacceptable to proceed on the assumption that all children's evidence is credible and
reliable (Carmichael & Sarre, 1994, p. 118). The focus needs to be on the evaluation of
the individual child witness, rather than on children as a class of witness. The aspects
of The Act which facilitate this individual assessment are, therefure, seemingly
justified. Rather than creating special provision for hearing the evidence of children,
these reforms bring children on to equal footing with other witnesses. This may
facilitate the reception of their evidence, however the effect on the rights of the
defendant are seemingly minimal.
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The second express concern voiced by the Law Refonn Commission was the need
to alleviate, or at least minimise, trauma for the child witness. There is a limited amount
of research pertaining to the psychological effects experienced by witnesses due to their
involvement in a criminal investigation and trial (Fiin, 1990, p. 275). However, it is
generally accepted that involvement in legal proceedings can be traumatic to a child,
inhibiting their testimony or possibly even contributing to a false retraction or refusal
to testifY at all (Warner, 1988). High levels of anxiety are not conducive to effective
testimony in either children or adults (Davies, 1993), and although the specific impact

of stress and anxiety on witnesses' ability to recall and recount events is somewhat
uncertain, there is abundant anecdotal evidence to the effect that witnesses believe that
the quality of their evidence was negatively affected by the anxiety they experienced in
the witness box (Fiin, 1990, p. 277).

Introduction of Tbe Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and Others) Actl992

In November 1992, legislation was enacted in the form of the Acts Amendment
(Evidence ofChildren and Others) Act 1992 (Appendix 2). The stated intention of this
legislation was to address some of the difficulties encountered by children, and other
witnesses designated as particularly vulnerable, when giving evidence (Berinson, 1992,
p. 15). The major provisions of this legislation to be discussed here are as follows:

•

Section I OOA, allowing the unsworn evidence of a person not competent to take
the oath or swear their solemn affirmation, was amended to specifically include a
child who is of or over the age of 12 years.
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•

Section 101 of the Evidence Act/906 was repealed. The most significant feature
of this is the abolition of the mandatory statutory requirement that the unsworn
evidence of a child under 12 years must be corroborated in order to obtain a
conviction.

•

By the insertion of section 106B, children aged under 12 years are deemed
competent to give sworn evidence if, in the opinion of the court, the child
understands that -

(a)

the giving of evidence is a serious matter; and

(b)

he or she in giving evidence has an obligation to tell the truth that is over
and above the ordinary duty to tell the truth.

This removed the requirement that a child must believe in God or in a divine sanction
for telling a lie. Furthermore, this section permits a child who is competent to take the
oath, but does not wish to do so, to make a solemn affirmation in the same way as an
adult.

•

Section 106C permits a child under 12 to give unsworn evidence if he or she does
not appear to understand that 'the giving of evidence is a serious matter and/or the

special obligation to tell the truth in giving evidence (which were the previous
requirements under section 101 ). The main criteria is that the child is able to give
an intelligible account of events which he or she has observed or experienced.
Thus very young children are now able to provide testimony.
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•

Section I 060 explicitly precludes a corrobomtion warning being given to the jury
solely on the basis that the witness whose evidence is uncorrobomted is a child,
whether that evidence be sworn or unsworn. The "age of the witness should not be
a basis for comment as this may imply that child witnesses are inherently less
trustworthy or reliable than other witnesses" (Dixon, 1994a). However, this does
not override the authority of the court to issue such a warning where, with regard
to the evidence of aparticular individual, there is considered an appropriate need
for a warning to be issued on other grounds.

•

Child witnesses aged under 16 years now have the right to have a support person
seated near them throughout the trial. This person must be approved by the court,
and must not be a witness in, or party to, the proceedings (s. 106E);

•

Counsel may seek the assistance of an appropriately qualified person in
communicating with a child witness who may have difficulty in understanding
questions or in framing answers which satisfY the questioner (s. 106F). The
function of this person is, if requested by the judge, to communicate and explain
to the child the questions put to the child, and to communicate and to explain to the

court the evidence given by the child.

Any person appointed under this section must take an oath, or make a declamtion in
such form as the Court sees fi~ that they will perform their duties "faithfully". If, in the
course of their duties, they wilfully make any false or misleading statements- either to
the child or to the court - they commit an indictable offence.
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•

Under section 106G, an unrepresented accused- one who has not engaged the
services oflegal counsel - may not directly cross-examine a child witness under the
age of 16. Instead, all questions must be put to the child through an intermediary.
This intermediary will be either the judge, or another person approved by the court,
and questions must be repeated accurately to the child.

It is believed that this will facilitate the child giving evidence by reducing any perceived
threat the child may feel in the presence of the accused.

Further provisions apply in Schedule 7 proceedings. In addition to applications for
care and protection orders under the Child Welfare Act 1947, Schedule 7 proceedings
inCOJ]JOmte a variety of criminal hearings relating primarily to alleged sexual offences
or other offences causing physical harm (Appendix 3). These provisions are usually
justified on the basis of the need to reduce the trauma associated with both face-to-face
confrontation with the defendant, and with telling embarrassing stories in the
"intimidating atmosphere of a traditional courtroom" (Dixon, 1994a). The provisions
include:

•

Under section 106H, the admissibility of certain out-of-court statements deemed
"relevant" to the proceeding, which were made by the child to another person prior
to the proceedings being commenced. The defendant must be provided with a copy
of the statement if recorded, otherwise with full details of the statement, and the
child must be available for cross-examination.
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•

Sections I 06I - I 06M allow for the admission of video-taped statements, videorecorded evidence in chief and/or video-recorded evidence taken at a pre-trial
hearing.

•

Section 106N provides for the utilisation of closed-circuit television or screening

arrangements as a standard requiremen~ unless the trial judge is satisfied that the
child witness is able, and wishes, to give evidence in the courtroom in the presence

of the defendant. Thus the child does not have to be in the presence of the accused
(in the case of closed-circuit TV) or in view of the accused (when CCTV is
unavailable). The child must remain visible to the court- specifically to the parties
involved and to the jury- throughout their testimony.

There is an additional requirement under section 106P of The Act that the judge in a
jury trial must instruct the jury that the procedure involving use of CCTV is a routine
one, and they are not to draw any inference from it as to the defendanfs guilt or
mnocence.

The Act also makes provision for a person other than a child to he designated as
a spetial witness, giving them access to a support person and to the use of video-recorded evidence and closed-circuit television.

Although there is widespread support for the introduction of such measures to
address the needs of the child witness (Dixon, 1994a; LRCWA, 1991; Flin, I990), it
does not appear that snfficiently rigorous evaluation has been given to the corresponding
effect on defendants' rights. It will he argued that it is the measures introduced to reduce
the trauma associated with involvement in the trial process which are the most
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controversial in tenns of their incompatibility with the rights of the defendant. Although
the traditional treatment of children as a "special class" of persons under the law has
already been acknowledged, a central consideration in this instance is whether, in so
doing, we create a "special class" of defendant whose rights receive less consideration

than a defendant facing different criminal charges.

Whilst cross.,jurisdictional comparisons are always

difficul~

similar legislative

reforms in other jurisdictions have been criticised on a number of grounds. In the United
States, for example, where individual rights are clearly delineated in the Constitution,
a special provision enacted in the state of Texas to admit the videotaped testimony of
a child under the age of thirteen was held to be unconstitutional on the basis that it
infringed the constitutional right to due process (Warner, !988). Similarly, the use of
screening techniques and dosed-circuit television have been successfully contested as

infringing a defendanfs Sixth Amendment right to confront their accuser (Coy v. Iowa,
487 U.S. I012 (1988)). By contrast, in the United Kingdom support has been generated
for the view that there is no absolute right to face-to-face confrontation. In the case of
Smellie v. R ([1919]14 Cr App R 128), where the defendant was removed from the

courtroom while his daughter gave evidence, an appeal based on the (alleged) common
Jaw right to "be within sight and hearing of all the witnesses throughout his trial" was
dismissed. As the United Kingdom has been instrumental in providing Australia with

a constitutional"model" since white sett1ement, and since neither England nor Australia
recognise a constitutional right to confrontation, the considemtions raised in these
countries are bound to ditrer from those in the United States (Cashmore, 1990).

Current arguments which seek to downplay the effect of Western Australian
legislative reform on the rights of the defendant are often far from compelling. For
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example, section 635 of The Criminal Code [WA] specifies that criminal trials must
take place in the presence of the pell!Ons accused unless, by their conduct (tor esample,
continued interruptions), they render continuation ofthe proceedings in their presence
impracticable. Claims such as that offered by the Law Refonn Commission of Western
Australia (1991, p. 67) that Section 635 cannot be held as an "insuperable objection" to
the use of closed circuit television because this medium was unforeseeable when the
legislation was enacted are not sufficiently convincing to justifY the overriding of
accepted practice without more stringent or reasoned argument. Whilst there is no
question that modem technological advancement has exceeded all expectations of the
legislators responsible for the original statute, mere availability of technology is not

always sufficient grounds to warrant its utilisation.

Much of the contention arises from the ambiguity associated with the nature of
defendants' rights, and the lack of clear guidelines for the resolution of conflict where

competing interests are involved. Australian jurisdictions have no document or charter
which clearly specifies the precise nature of the rights of the criminal defendant, mther
we are dependent on a somewhat piecemeal concoction of common law practice,
conceptions of nature! law and nature! rights, rights created or reinforced through the
ratification of various treaties (although these are not automatically legally enforceable)
and legislative stipulations. Until a clear delineation of defendants' rights is established,

we have no basis from which to evaluate the legitimacy oflegislative refonn.
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CHAPTER TWO- THE NOTION OF RIGHTS

The tenn "human rights"- which replaces what were fonnerly referred to as the
"rights of man" or, at an earlier time, "natural rights" (Cranston, 1983)- is commonly
heard in modem society. Despite frequent exhortations to the notion of rights, there
appears little agreemen~ either today or historically, as to the precise definition of what
a right actually is. Accordingly, in discussing the (alleged) human right to privacy,
Wellman (1978, p. 368) mises three philosophical questions equally applicable to any
human right: firstly, how do we know that there really is such a human right; secondly,
assuming that the right exists, what duties or obligations does it imply; and finally,
precisely how is the content of the right to be defined?

Natuml rights theorists propound the existence of rights, common to all people,
which are inherent in, and integml to, human existence. In the 17th centwy, for
example, Locke promoted a conception ofnatumllaw based on three propositions: that
the natural order of the universe was ordained by God; that, through the use of reason,
man is able to discover the valid and objective rules of conduct which were prescribed
by God; and that these rules can be known with certainty (Cranston, 1983). Locke
(1690) also argued that men were equally entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of
the law of nature, specifically the natural right to life, liberty and estate (property).

Natuml rights philosophy has been undeniably influential in motivating political
action. The Bill of Rights enacted by the English Parliament in 1689 translated the
natural rights espoused by Locke into positive legal rights, incorpomting (among other

tltings) the right for any person charged with a criminal offence to a fair and public trial

bY jury (Cmnston, 1983), which had been acknowledged since the Magna Carta. Claims
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in the preamble to the 1776 American Declaration of Independence that it is "selfevident that all men are created equal [and] that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights" and the assertions in the 1789 French Declaration of the
Rights of Man that "Men are born, and always continue free and equal in respect of their

.. -..

'·

rights" and that "The end of all political associations is the preservation ofthe natural
and imprescriptible rights of man" (translated in O'Neill & Handley, 1994, pp. 8-9) are
but two examples of the increasing affiliation with natural rights principles which was
evident throughout the 18th century. When viewed objectively, it must be concluded
that, irrespective of the truth of natural rights philosophy and its failure to consider the
realities of social groups, classes and power elites, the natural rights doctrine was a
powerful and influential politieal philosophy which inspired action on the part of a great
many people (Boller, 1977).

Bentham, one of the most outspoken early critics of natural right•. adhered to the
view that only from 11 real" (or positive) law could one acquire "real" rights. He tenned

natural law "imaginary", claiming that, as such, it could spawn only imaginary rights

which, rather than OOing imprescriptible as claimed, were the equivalent of "rhetorical
nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts" (Bentham, 1843). From Bentham 1s perspective,
political obligation to such an untenable precept as natural rights was entirely
unrealistic and could not create enough of an obligation on legal and political structures
to act. Similarly, Sumner (1913, pp. 79-83) asserted that nature was more harsh than
benign, that men were not born equal, and that human rights were not natumlly
bestcwed, rather they were the product of civilisation. Legislatively limned positive law,
in contrast to the metaphysical concepts of natural law and natural rights, was
increasingly pmpounded as the only means through which rights could be attained and
enforced: politicians such as Burke asserted that belief in natural rights implanted "false
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ideas and vain expectations into men destined to travel the obscure walk of laborious
life" (Burke, 1832, pp. 180-181 ), encouraging revolntionary action which posed a threat
to the methods of compromise, employed by competing interests, which were necessary
for the prosperity of civil society (Margolis, 1978).

The rise of ntilitarianism in the 19th century - originally derived from the work of
Bentham - challenged the legitimacy of natural rights doctrine. The utilitarian emphasis
on maximising the greatest happiness for the greatest number, in contrast to the natural
rights concern with tht' specific interests of individuals (Jones, 1994) was indicative of
this changing political focus. Whereas the rights espoused in the 18th century were
largely concerned with protecting the individual from arbitrary state powers, the 19th
centwy saw the development of interest in socio-economic rights which were directed
not only at the state (through claims for the provision of services and facilities), but also
against other citizens (such as employee against employer). Western democmtic
governments gradually began to recognise and accept a responsibility to address a
variety of social and economic injustices at a societal level, particularly those pertaining
to working conditions and exploitation of labour, public health, welfare and education
(O'Neill & Handley, 1994, p. 10). In such instances, concern for the citizen acquired a
collective, mther than individual, focus. Although there remained a feeling for
individual rights, it became conceivable that the rights of the individual and the rights
of society might, at times, be incompatible. Consequently, it became possible to view
the rights of the individual as subservient to the wider needs of society as awhole.

Here rests perhaps the most fundamental concern with the concept of natural rights.
As suggested by Edwards (1996) there is an intuitive feeling that natural rights "are, or
should be, absolute and indefeasible", yet one must question how these rights are to be
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upheld if the interests of the individual to whom the rights must, of necessity, apply are
not always held to be of paramount importance. Indeed, it is the notion of the
indefeasibility of natural rights which has attracied some of the most vociferous, and
the most enduring, criticism. In order to be absolute, rights must be have a solid
conceptual foundation, the content of the right - and any correlative obligations - must
be clearly delineated and there must be appropriate channels through which to seek
redress for alleged breaches of rights. As the Australian Law Reform Commission has

noted, "rights without remedies may be no more than rhetoric 11 (cited in Evans, 1984;
cf. Allen, 1990, p. 159): if a particular right cannot be claimed in practice it becomes

difficult to substantiate it as a right per se.

More recent theorists have endeavoured to explain and define the nature and
content of rights in a marmer which facilitates their being upheld in the political arena.
Although it is often suggested that rights necessarily correlate with duties, Hohfeld's
(1919) classification of rights recognised that legally enforceable rights could take one
of four forms: a claim, a privilege (or liberty), a power or an immunity. Claims pamllel
the traditional narrow understanding of a right, whereby the right of one party is
matched by an obligation or duty imposed on some other party. The liberty or privilege

to undertake or participate in a particular activity exists provided, in so doing, no
prohibition against such activity is broken (that is, there is no claim against the agent
participating in such activity). A legal power is dependent upon a person's legal
competence to perform an act which impacts upon another party (invoking the
correlative oflegalliability), and a legal immunity arises when there is a disability (or,

in Hohfeldian terms, a 11no-power11 ) on the part of othefs to do a particular thing
(Hohfeld, 1919; cf. Martin, 1993, pp. 29-30). As a category, legal rights are defined by
Wellman (1978, p. 369) as "institutional ... [being] created, defined and maintained by
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the legal system in some society". As such, they are neither fixed nor, as a result,
absolute: whenever circumstances require, they can be redefined by the prevailing legal
system.

Internationally, a proliferation of rights-based declarations, covenants and
agreements have sought to put tbe issue of human rights squarely on the political
agenda. Although it must be acknowledged that such covenants are not automatically
legally enforceahle in specific jurisdictions, they provide a visible indication of the
stated intent of the relevant signatories to uphold the rights contained therein. Tay
(1986, p. 11) suggests that international human rights agreements should be more
accurately viewed as indications of the direction the law should take: as redress through
international courts of law is unlikely except for gross breaches of human rights

agreements, there is a need for individual jurisdictions to enact appropriate (that is,
supportive) legislation. Whilst this may be seen as a concession to the superiority of

positive law, there is a tacit understanding that legislation should enhance, not override,
the consideration of certain fundamental or natural rights.

It is important to note that even many rights-based covenants in the natural rights

tradition in effect quality the notion of "absolute" rights. For example, The United
Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights acknowledges, in tbe
preamble, the "equal and inalienable rights of all members of tbe human family". In
Article 6, however, the "inherent right to life" shared by every human being is qualified
by the injunction that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life" [italics added].
Again in Article 9, the right to liberty is acknowledged "except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law". There is perhaps no more
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concrete indication of the modem day realisation that even the so-called natuml rights
are defeasible - not only in principle, but also, in prescribed circumstances, in practice.

Protection of Rights in Australia

Having established tha~ unless enacted positively in law, even the so-called natural
rights are defeasible, it is necessary to identity the precise means through which human
rights are protected in Australia. In practice, natural rights may be incorporated into a
common law legal system by one of three means: through incorporation into the
Constitution, in the meta-physical principles of the common law, or as statements of
political aims for society (Edwards, 1996). Human rights protection in Australian
society is, in varying degrees, dependent upon each of these.

Constitutional rights have been championed as the highest order rights within our
legal system (O'Neill & Handley, 1994, pp. 26-28). The Australian reality is, however,
that constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights are remarkably few, raising concern
as to the adequacy oflegal protection for individual rights in this country (Jones, 1994).
It is widely accepted that explicit rights within the Australian Constitution are limited

only to trial by jury (s. 80), freedom of religion (s. 116), acquisition of property (s. 51),
voting rights (ss. 24 and 41 ), prohibition of discrimination against interstate residents
(s. 117) and freedom of movement between the states (s. 92) (Jones, 1994; cf O'Neill
& Handley, 1994, pp. 44-74). In framing the federal constitution, the incorporation of

a Bill of Rights similar to that enacted by the United States was "consciously and
deliberately rejected" (Tay, 1986, p. 18). Instead, there is a traditional acceptance in
both legal and political spheres that the common law principles upon which Australian
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law is founded are sufficient to ensure that citizens are entitled to "due process and
equality before the law" (Fletcher, 1993).

Jones (1994) suggP.sts that our common law inheritance was indicative of the
prevailing "conservative" philosophy in 18th and 19th century Britain, whereby it was
maintained that the only rights were those identifiable in the laws and customs of
previous social orders. It was litis "inheritance of collective wisdom about rights" rather

than the philosophy of natural rights, which drove Government policy: it was believed
that "Common law precedents provided a stronger protection for individual liberties
than abstract and ill-defined rights" (Jones, 1994). This perspective is not without its
dissenters. Opponents contend that, although the common law has developed over

numerous years on a case-by-case basis, it "has not developed general statements of
principle which may be relied upon in the courts to protect human rights" (O'Neill &
Handley, 1994, p. 85). Thus the ambiguity associated with the concept of rights- and
more particularly, the enforcement of rights - has not been satisfactorily resolved.

There are a number of concerns mised with regard to common law conceptions of
the protection of individual rights. Perhaps most important is the inherent vulnerability
of common law rights to abrogation or removal by statute law (Jones, 1994; O'Neill &
Handley, 1994, p. 89). As noted previously, all legal rights are both created and
maintained by a given legal system. If a specific aspect of common law tradition (or

precedent) comes to be regarded as either obsolete or as insufficient to accommodate
new situations or cases, the applicable rule may be redefined by legal institutions such
as the courts or the legislature (Wellman, 1978). Where the legislature intervenes,
citizens are left to take it 'on trust' that, in accordance with the notion of a responsible
and representative government, individual rights will be upheld (Jones, 1994). This is
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by no means guaranteed. There is virtually unlimited scope for the legal - that is,
statutory - curtailment of common law rights unless such restriction is itself
constitutionally forbidden (Jones, 1994). Furthermore, whilst the judiciary is perceived
as the protector of individual rights through the application of the rule of law (Jones,
1994), a "court cannot deny the validity of an exercise of a legislative power expressly
granted merely on the ground that the law abrogates human rights and fundamental
freedoms or trenches upon political rights which, in the court's opinion, should be
preserved" (Brennan J, cited in Jones, 1994).

The push for rights-based legislation has been a recurrent theme in modem political
history. In 1973, a Human Rights Bill introduced by Senator Lionel Murphy- which
sought to protect the rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights- was blocked in the Opposition-controlled Senate (Tay, 1986, p. 22).
A second attempt to introduce federal legislation little more than a decade later also
faltered when the Australian Bill ofRights 1985 was allowed to lapse. On this occasion,
heated political and community debate focused on "the issue of States rights and the
incursion of Commonwealth power into areas of State responsibility" (Fletcher, 1993)
rather than on the proposed rights per se. Under our federal system, the power of the
Commonwealth government to legislate for the nation as a whole is constitutionally
limited: there is little provision for legislating in the human rights area, and attempts to
justifY proposed legislation under sections such as 51(29)- "External Affairs"- the
section which prompted debate in 1985/86, have been largely unsuccessful
(Weeramantry, 1990, p. 240). It seems, therefore, a reasonable suggestion that the
decision not to proceed with an Australian Bill of Rights was influenced by a perceived
need to retain the limits applicable to Commonwealth power, mther than being
necessarily indicative of public and I or political attitudes to human rights legislation
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in geneml. This is perhaps reflected by the more recent (albeit limited) fedeml
enactment of rights-based legislation mandating (among other things) antidiscrimination and equal opportunity policies, areas which were conceivably
inadequately protected under common law pmctice.

Australia's fedeml government has also demonstrated a commitment to protection
of human rights through its mtification of all major 20th centwy international
declamtions of rights. Certainly, many of the fundamental rights proclaimed in
documents such as the Universal Declamtion of Human Rights and the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights - for example, the concept of equality before the law, the right
to a fair trial, and the presumption of innocence - are conceptions which have evolved
in common law history and are, therefore, a pre-existent component of our lega1
inheritance (Tay; 1986, p. 17). Thus it is thmugh both our common law heritage and the
mtification of the mojor international human rights treaties that Australia has assumed
an obligation to ensure that the rights contained therein are upheld within its boundaries
(O'Neill & Handley, 1994, p. 113). Australia has also ratified the Optional Protocol of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows an individual
claiming a violation of their specified rights, and having exhausted all available
domestic remedies, to request investigation by the International Human Rights
Committee. As with many issues under international law, however, the Committee's
adjudication may be construed as only politically influential or per.;uasive mther than
legally enforceable (Fletcher, 1993). Indeed, it has been suggested that the faith placed
in international supervision is mther over-optimistic and we should instead be
developing the means through which greater domestic scrutiny is fucilitated (Jones,
1994).
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

That the right to a fair trial is of international concern is evident from most 20th
centmy declarations of human rights. In 1948, the right to a fair trial was incorporated
into the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 10), and has
since been reiterated in Article 14 of the United Nations' International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. It is similarly acknowledged in various documents of more
localised jurisdictions, such as Article 18 of the 1948 American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man and Article 6 of the 1966 European Convention on Human
Rights.

Pre~dating

Australia's ratification of various international agreements, Mason

(1995) states that, from our common law traditions, the right to a fair trial was already
established as a central precept of our legal system. The necessary elements of a fair
trial are, however, neither absolute nor immutable: the specification of these elements

falls under the jurisdiction of the courts - and ultimately the High Court, which is
Australia's final Court of Appeal (Mason, 1995). As part of the process of law reform
generally, this process has been described as the "onward march to the unattainable end
of perfect justice" (Jago v District Court [NSWJ [1989]168 CLR 23 per Brennan J at
41 ), a statement which encapsulates the conviction that the judicial process, no matter
how strictly regulated, cannot guarantee that all parties involved will perceive an

equitable or 'fair' outcome.

Uglow (n.d.) asserts that there are three aspects to legal fairness: the fairness of the
rule, the fairness of the procedure, and the fairness of the decision. "The doctrine of
sovereignty of Parliament meant that from the 17th centmy the courts would not
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interfere in the substantive quality of a statute" (Uglow, n.d. ), thus the substantive
nature of any given rule- and, as a ciJnsequence, responsibility for fairness of the rule must rest with the legislature. At this point it is pertinent to reitemte the concern,
outlined previously, that the legislature does not always - or at least, of necessity - give
adequate regard to individual rights.

The pmctices relevant at the trial stage are those which are encompassed under the
banner of procedural fairness. At common law, Uglow (n.d.) cites the elements of
proceduml fairness as being:

•

the right for the defendant to be made aware of the nature of the charges and
evidence against him or her

•

the right to legal representation

•

the presumption of innocence, which incorporates the right to silence and the

burden of proof being placed on the prosecution
•

the applicable standard of proof being beyond reasonable doubt

•

the right to a public trial in a neutral forum

•

the right to cross-examine and test the prosecution evidence

•

the right to call evidence and give evidence on the accused's behalf

•

the right of appeal.

From an analysis of a nwnber of docwnents, namely the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the InterAmerican Convention on Human Rights, Harris (1967) identifies four categories to
which the notion of filirness is applicable: the character of the court, the public nature
of the hearing, the rights of the accused in conducting his or her defence, and a
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miscellany of other single rules. He asserts that: courts must be established by law and
must remain both independent and impartial; that, with few exceptions (such as the
interests ofjustice, for reasons of public order, or for reasons of national security), the
hearing must be conducted in public; that accused persons must be informed of the
charge against them and must be given adequate time and facilities to prepare a
defence; that the accused has the right to obtain legal representation, the right to cross-

examine witnesses, the right to obtain the attendance of and to examine witnesses on
behalf of the defence, the right to be present at his or her bial, the rightto an interpreter,
the right to freedom from self-incrimination and the right of appeal; and that the
defendant must be afforded the presumption of innocence.

Importantly, Harris ( 1967) acknowledges that "there are other il!definable
characteristics of a fair bial. It is possible for all the rules which can be formulated with
any precision to be observed and yet for the bial to be such that a fair hearing is not
given". He offers as an example the need for the conduct ofthe court to be appropriately
11

Serious". This concern was simiiarly voiced by Gaudron J (in Dietrich v The Queen,

[1992]177CLR 292 at 70), who stated "the law recognises that sometimes, despite the
best efforts of all concerned, a trial may be unfair even though construed sbictly in

accordance with the law". Thus there is a sense that fairness and the law pertaining to
legal practice are independent constructs which are not necessarily entirely compatible,
a perspective supported by Gaudron J who recognises that there are various contexts in
which the requirement of fairness is "independent from and additional to the
requirement that a trial be conducted in accordance with law" (Dietrich v The Queen
[1992]177 CLR 292 at 363). In overturning the original conviction in Dietrich, the High
Court emphasised the right to a fair trial as a "fundamental prescript of the law of this
counny" (per Deane J at 31) indicating that the defining characteristic of fairness must
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be given primacy over other procedural concerns. It is apparent, therefore, that
procedural objectives and legal pmctice must be developed and implemented in
accordance with the right of the accused to a fair trial.

Although Machan (1989, p. 63) claims that proponents of the natural rights
tradition seek to explain human rights in a way which eliminates the possibility that
specific rights can conflict either among each other for the one individual, or among
each other between different individuals, this proposition is difficult to sustain. One of
the principal concerns in the loosely defined nature of natural rights - the fact that the
specific rights claimed under this doctrine differ between individual theorists on the
basis of their conception of nature (O'Neill & Handley, 1994, p. 8)- is evidence of the
difficulty involved in actually specifYing rights with any degree of certainty. Exhortation

to legal rights does not. however, necessarily resolve this dilemma: evidence of
conflicting goals, values and interests inherent in the legal system are commonplace in
jurisprudential literature (Spader, 1984), whereby prioritisation of respective rights
becomes a centrnl concern. There is perhaps no better example ofthis conflict than that
between opposing parties in a criminal trial:

Invariably invocation in a given case of the right to a fair trial generates
an element of tension between the implementation of the right and some
other competing interest~ for example. the public interest in securing the
conviction of persons who have committed criminal offences. In that
respect, the right to a fair trial may be compared with free-standing
fundamental rights protected by a statute or constitution (Mason, 1995).
The conflict created by competing interests in a criminal trial is not satisfactorily
resolved by the various international human rights documents. This is particularly
apparent in trials involving juveniles. For example, Article 14(1) of the United Nations
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that "any judgment rendered
in a criminal case ... shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons

otherwise requires"; Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights requires
that all judgments be made public, however allows that "the Press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial ... where the interests of juvePJies or the protection
of the private life of the parties so require". Although the protection of the interests of

juveniles involved in criminal proceedings is a notable concern, an equally important
consideration is the realisation that, in the enthusiasm to promote victims' rights
(irrespective of whether or not the victim is a child), the legal system must not lose sight
of the necessary regard for the rights of alleged offenders (Anderson, 1995). Thus the
legitimacy of legislating to address the perceived needs of the child witness is not fully
justified when the resultant legislation impacts upon the legitimate right of the
defendant to a fair trial.

Thomas Paine also argued that equality of rights is not necessarily matched with
equality of powers: In a state of nature, some people will always be more able to

achieve or exercise their rights than others. Additionally. there is no guarantee that even
the strongest will necessarily be able to do as they please, "for their natural powers fall
somewhat short oftheir natural wants" (cited in Boller, 1977). Associated with a lack
of power is the concept of vulnerability: just as different groups in society hold more or

less power than others, so too do different groups experience a greater or lesser degree
of vulnerability than others. Children are acknowledged as particularly vulnerable by
. virtue of their lack of autonomy and, in some cases, inability to speak for themselves
(Sieber, 1992, p. 94). The particular vulnerability of the child is, indeed, acknov·: ::dged
through the enactment of the particular legislation under investigation in this thesis,
much of which is directed at enabling the child to give evidence more readily.
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Interestingly, however, another classification of vulnerability relates to those who, for
whatever reason, are deemed unlikely to attract public sympathy (Sieber, 1992, p. 93).
It seems prudent to assume that defendants in (predominantly) child sexual abuse cases

-upon whom the provisions of The Act impact- could be so classified.

The resolution of conflicting interests in a trial situation is difficult. There is,
however, a widespread acceptance that the right to a fair biallargely overrides other
individual claims to rights within the context of the bial setting (Jones, 1990, p. 8;

Uglow, n.d.). The conception of a fair trial is given priority over more 11pragmatic aims
such as the determination of truth or law enforcement .... In the court, the accused's
rights are pammount because the covert function of the trial is its concrete illustmtion
of a fair and just society" (Uglow, n.d. ). The notion of fairness, extraneous to resolution
of the dispute in question, highlights the fact that such resolution is not, of necessity, the
ultimate goal of the court (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 538). Therefore, although attempts must
be made to balance competing interests in a criminal bial, the defendant's right to a fair
trial must be preserved as the definitive consideration. If an equal balance between the
rights of the defendant and those of the victim can not be achieved, procedural fairness
demands that the defendant receive any benefit of the imbalance.
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CHAPTER FOUR- IMPACT OF mE ACT ON mE RIGHT

TO A FAIR TRIAL

Having briefly reviewed the philosophy pertaining to rights, the provisions for the
protection of individual rights which are currently available within the Australian legal
system, and the specific components of the individual right to a fair trial, the remainder
of this thesis will provide an analysis of potential incompatibilities between The Act and
defendants' rights. Specifically, this discussion will address the right to a fair trial, and

the various provisions contained in The Act which impact upon this notion of fairness.

Closed Circuit Television, Screening, and the Presumption of Innocence

Australian criminal law dictates that, where allegations are made against an
accused person, that person is held to be innocent until proven guilty (Cahill & O'Neill,
1991, p. 103). Specifically, the presumption of innocence serves as a means of assigning
the burden of proof to the prosecution (Morton & Hutchison, 1987, p. 14; Heydon,
1984, p. 43). The prosecution must provide evidence of the guilt of the accused, and this
evidence must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a conviction to be
sustained (Morton & Hutchison, 1987, p. 2).

It has been argued (Turner, 1994, p. 357) that, in cases of child sexual abuse, "...

the defendant starts out with a double advantage - there is not merely a presumption of
innocence but a presumption that the crime is unthinkable. Most people, including
jurors, do not want to believe that an adult is capable of sodomising a child". This view
is supported by Dixon ( 1994b), who suggests that adults may find it attractive to assume
that a child's allegations of sexual abuse are no more than fanciful imaginings, because
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acceptance of such abuse as a reality is intolerable. She concludes that this abhorrence
extends to jurors who, due to an unwillingness to accept that anyone could commit such
a horrific crime, may be swayed by such suggestions should they be raised by the
defence during the trial. She concludes that the ultimate outcome is an increased
likelihood of acquittal.

Conversely, it has been suggested that members of the public hsve a tendency to
consider a person accused of a crime to be in fact guilty of that crime without

necessarily giving adequate regard to the evidence of the case (Netteburg, 1987, p. 288),
raising concern that the defendant actually starts out at a disadvantage. Additionally,
rather than viewing children as inherently unreliable witnesses, it hss been suggested
that juries might in fact be inclined to underestimate the ability of a child witness to lie
(McGinley & Waye, 1988). This is perhaps even more likely when the alleged offence

is one as emotive and distasteful as child sexual abuse:

Recognising that the offender against children is almost universally
despised within the general community should emphasise the need to
ensure that a person who is merely the subject of an allegation of child
abuse is given a fair hearing before they are 'branded' as a child molester.
Because the crime is so seriously regarded a person in that position needs
and deserves, if anything, a greater level of protection against being
wrongfully convicted (Byrne, 1991, p. 8).
From litis perspective, and in recognition of the fact that the defendant may commence
the trial already at a disadvantage, "the presumption of innocence cautions the juty to
put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from arrest, the indictment, and
the anaignmen~ and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced"
(Morton & Hutchison, 1987, p. 3).
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Irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions must be accepted by the courts absolutely,
whereas persuasive presumptions are accepted until such time as the court is persuaded
otherwise and evidential presumptions are accepted until credible evidence to the
contrary is provided (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 315). "Facts may be presumed either as a
general rule or only upon the establishing of other (basic) facts"- the presumption of
innocence is an example of the fonner (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 315).

Considerable evidence - both anecdotal and, to a lesser extent, empirical research indicates that one of the most stressful aspects oflegal proceedings for the child is being
in the presence of the defendant (Whitcomb, Shapiro & Stellwagen, 1985; Flin, Davies
& Tarrant, 1988; Cashmore, 1990; Spencer & Flin, 1990, pp. 229-231; Flin, 1990, p.

278; ALRC, 1992, p. I; Goodman, Levine & Melton, 1992). Concern has been raised
that the likely result of such stress or trauma is the inability of the child to provide
satisfactory testimony- if indeed they are able to testity at all (ALRC, 1989, p. 4).
Largely from this (and similar) evidence it is argued that there is a need to separate the
child witness from the defendant throughout the trial, more particularly at the time the
child is required to give evidence. If removed from the physical presence of the
defendant, it is posited that the ensuing reduction in anxiety will facilitate the provision
of more coherent, accurate and comprehensive testimony (Cashmore, 1990; Spencer &
Flin, 1990, p. 83).

In Western Australia, this recommendation has been acknowledged as being of
sUfficient importance to warrant legislative amendment, and is dealt with under section
106N of The Act permitting the use of closed circuit television or screening
arrangements. Under these provisions, either:
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•

the child gives testimony from outside the courtroom, but from within the court
precincts, and the testimony is transmitted to the court via closed circuit television
- a practice which is also considered beneficial in that it removes the child from the
"intimidating" atmosphere ofthe courtroom (Davies, 1993); or

•

the defendant is removed from the courtroom whilst the child gives evidence,
however this evidence is transmitted to the defendant via closed circuit television;
or

•

where closed circuit television is unavailable screening is utilised, ensuring that
while the child cannot see the defendan~ the child remains visible to the Judge, the
jury, the defendant and defence counsel.

Although section I06P of The Act specifically requires that where the use of closed
circuit television or screening arrangements are employed the Judge is to instruct the
jury that it is a routine pmctice and no inference as to the defendant1s guilt or innocence

should be drawn from it, this practice is, at least potentially, problematic. The ability
of the jury to overlook the obvious contradictions between the instruction and the
practice of separation has not been substantiated with any degree of certainty (Cashmore
& Cahill, 1990). This is a fimdamental concern because the ultimate effectiveness

of the jury warning is most certainly dependent upon whether the jury perceive "that
the procedure has been adopted because ofthe accused's presumed guil~ or because
there are other significant considerations which make it desirable" (Szwarc, 1991, p.
134). In separating the child witness from the defendant, there is a tacit
acknowledgment that the child has reason to be hesitant in giving evidence in front of
the accused. "The assumption that the fear is caused by having been abused by the
defendant already assumes guilt and violates the presumption of innocence"
(Underwager & Wakefield, 1992). Additionally, this assumption ignores the possibility
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that any fear expressed by the child may reflect a variety of influences in the interim
between making their accusation and delivering their testimony: in particular, "Fear may
be learned from adults repeatedly telling a child that the accused has hurt them, is bad,
wicked, should be punished, and is to be feared" (Underwager & Wakefield, 1992),
rather than a genuine emotion based on past incidents of abuse perpetrated by the
accused. Additionally, a witness who has knowingly made a false accusation is likely
to be fearful of confronting the accused and giving testimony, thus the expression of
fear must not be viewed as indicative of the guilt ofthe defendant (LRCWA, 1991, p.
72).

Furthermore, although anecdotal evidence provided by jurors suggests that they do
not believe their ability to adjudicate on the basis ofthe evidence was affected by the
use of closed circuit television (LRCWA, 1991) there appears to have been no direct
empirical evaluation of the adequacy ofthejwy warning with regard to the presumption
of innocence. Empirieal studies regarding the effect of closed circuit television on jurors
decisions have produce no definitive findings (Cashmore, 1990).

There are ways in which the erosion of the presumption of innocence can be
minimised. The Austtalian Law Reform Commission (1989, p. 16) suggests that making

either closed circuit television or screening arrangements a mandatory requirement
reduces the likelihood of the jwy inferring guilt from the use of the procedure. This
eliminates any potential bias associated with the procedure being deemed as warranted
by the circumstances of a particular case. Accordingly, under section I 060 of The Ac~
the use of this procedure is mandatory in Western Australia for all Schedule 7
proceedings unless specific application to give testimony in open court is made by the
prosecution and approved by the presiding Judge. Cashmore ( 1990) further suggests that
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the preferable mode of giving evidence is for the child to give evidence from outside
the courtroom. She suggests that this can be explained to the jwy in terms of the
intimidating nature of giving evidence in the courtroom generally, without specific
refurence to the presence of the accused, whereas the removal of the defendant from the
courtroom or the use of screens or partitions in the courtroom can only be explained in
terms of the effect the accused may have on the child witness. For this reason, removing
the child from the courtroom may be viewed as the less prejudicial alternative
(Cashmore, 1990; cf. Szwarc, 1991, p. 136). This is also more consistent with the
wording of section 635 of The Criminal Code [WA], whereby the defendant should be
removed from the courtroom only if, by his or her conduct, they render continuation of
the proceedings in their presence impmcticable.

Thus it is argued that the Western Austmlian legislation is of concern: in order to
minimise the impact of the use of closed circuit television on the presumption of
innocence it is the child, rather than the defendant, who should be removed from the
courtroom. This is not at present specified as the desired option in The Act. There is
also a need to ensure that appropriate closed circuit television equipment is made
available in all courtrooms as required to negate the need to use partitions, because
whenever such partitions are used the presumption of innocence is, at least potentially,
jeopardised. Although this would involve significant cost, it would appear necessary in
order to ensure minimal erosion of the rights of the procedural rights ofthe defendant
to a fair trial.

The presumption of innocence does not purport to eliminate mistaken decisions
because that is an impossible ideal, mther the aim is to ensure the elimination of
mistaken convictions (Morton and Hutchison, 1987, pp. 4-5), acknowledging the fact
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that the defendant must retain the benefit of any doubt. Although the need to minimise
the trauma associated with giving evidence in open court, in the presence of the
defendan~

is a credible concern, this need must be balanced with the right of the

accused to a fuir trial. The presumption of innocence must remain intact until sufficient
evidence to the contrary is adduced - and this presumption, rather than the protection
of the child witness, must remain the fundamental focus of criminal proceedings
(ALRC, 1989, p. 6).

Right to Conduct Own Defence

Traditionally, the defendant may either seek legal representation or choose to
conduct their own defence. In recent times, much has been made of the right of. the
defendant to procure legal representation. The Honorable Justice Mitchell of the
Supreme Court of South Australia asserted that the right to be defended by duly
qualified counsel was implicit in the recognition of the right to equality before the law
(1975). In Dietrich v The Queen ([1992]177 CLR 292) the High Court of Australia
determined that the court had a duty to ensure that the accused received a fair trial, and
that in the case of an unrepresented accused facing serious charges - who had, in this
instance, unsuccessfully sought legal representation through the Legal Aid Commission
ofVictoria- the discretion of the court to stay or adjourn the trial in order to allow the
defendant the necessary time to obtain representation should have been favourably
exercised in order to ensure fuimess. Although the majority decision indicated that there
is no absolute right to legal representation at public expense, there was an explicit
acknowledgment that competent legal representation in serious criminal cases is highly
-desirable.
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Just as there is no absolute right to legal representation at public expense, there is
no requirement that the defendant endeavour to obtain such representation. Under the
amended legislation, however, the right of the defendant to conduct their own defence
has been impinged upon by section I 06G of The Act, which mandates that an
unrepresented defendant may not question the child witness directly, but must put their
questions to the child through an intermediary- either the Judge or some other courtapproved person - who must then repeat the question accurately to the child. This
requirement is not limited to Schedule 7 proceedings, rather it extends to proceedings
for any offence where the defendant wishes to cross-examine a child under the age of
16 years.

As with the concerns raised regarding the use of screens and closed circuit
television, this practice was promoted on the basis that the child would be likely to find
cross-examination by an unrepresented accused particularly stressful (LRCWA, 1991,
p. 94). Again there is a tacit acknowledgment that the child has reason to feel
intimidated, an assumption which must certainly be viewed as prejudicial to the

preswnption of innocence. If the defendant is allowed to cross-examine other witnesses
but not the "affected" child, it becomes difficult to see any way in which this deviation
from standard practice could be viewed by the jury except in terms of the effect the
defendant would have on the child. Additionally, unlike the jury warning mandated

when screens or closed circuit television are utilised, the legislation does not contain
a similar requirement for a warning to be issued when questions are put to the child
through an intermediary. Thus there is no attempt to moderate the impact of this
procedure on the jury's perception of the innocence ofthe defendant, a situation which
is, at least potentially, prejudicial to the accused.
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Admissibility of Hearsay

The rule against hearsay has been described as "undoubtedly the most important
exclusionary rule in the law of evidence" (Waight and Williams, 1990, p. 643)
governing, as it does, much of what may or may not he presented in court. This rule
seeks to exclude the presentation of statements and assertions made by persons other
than the witness who is testifYing, where the evidence is offered as proofofthe truth of
what is stated (Australian Law Reform Commission, 1982b, p. 3). If, however, the
evidence is tendered solely for the purpose of establishing the fact that the statement
was indeed made, it is deemed admissible, thus the important elements for
consideration are the nature and source of the statement, and the purpose for which it
is tendered (Hallen, 1988, pp. 41-42).

Prior to the introduction of the Act, a number of exclusions to the rule against

hearsay were in existence. some of which were of possible relevance in cases of alleged
child sexual abuse. These included the doctrine of res gestae, whereby spontaneous
utterances made by the child contemporaneous with (that is, either shortly before or
after) the alleged assault were deemed admissible, as was evidence of a complaint
"recently or promptly made by the victim of sexual assault" (Warner, 1991, p. 172),
whether by a child or adult victim. The second of these exceptions did not extend
admissibility to statements regarding other forms of physical abuse (LRCWA, 1991, p.
37). Although it has been asserted that "The general approach to statutory reform of the
law of hearsay in Australia has been extremely cautious" (Tapper, 1992) the scope of
admissibility of hearsay evidence has been extended by the new legislation. Under
section 106H of The Act, certain out of court statements deemed relevant to the
proceeding, which were made by the child to another person prior to commencement
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of the proceedings, are deemed admissible. "A relevant statement is defined as one
which (a) relates to a matter in issue in the proceeding; and (b) was made by the child
to another person before the proceedings commenced" (Dixon, 1994a). Thus there is
now broad scope for hearsay evidence to be admitted.

Warner ( 1991, p. 173) describes the traditional rule against hearsay as "irrational"
in cases of child sexual abuse, because second-hand accounts may be more reliable than

first-hand accounts due to the difficulties children experience in giving evidence.
Additionally, she suggests that second-hand accounts are a necessuy inclusion where
first-hand accounts are unavailable (for example, when the child is incompetent to
testifY), a position supported by the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia,
which asserts that justifications for refonn are predominantly centred on the

unavailability of other evidence (1991, p. 35). To enact change on this basis, however,
must be viewed as precarious: exclusionary rules exist for a purpose, and to amend these
rules merely to facilitate the reception of a particular form of evidence· ruther than as
an acknowledgment that the grounds for exclusion are demonstrably false or
inapplicable • sets a dangerous precedent. If, on the other hand, the grounds for

exclusion are demonstrated to be invalid- a fact which has not been demonstrated in
this instance · the rule should be amended or removed not only with regard to the

evidence of children, but also for all other witnesses whose evidence is so excluded.

The prejudicial impact of the admissibility of out-of-court statements has perhaps
been minimised by the requirement that the child who was the original maker of the
statement must be available for cross-examination by the defence (s. I 06H [I b)). This,
however, negates the argument that a second-hand account should be admitted where
a first-hand account is unavailable · the argument upon which the call for admissibility
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of out-<>f-court statements was largely fouoded. If the child must be available for crossexamination, the defence will have the opportuoity to demand a ftrst-hand accouot of
the events in question - an opportuoity which would doubtless be acted upon.

Video-recordings and the Confrontation and Eumination of Witnesses

The rationale supporting the utilisation of video-taped evidence is a belief that, by
allowing their evidence to be obtained and recorded at an earlier stage, the effects of
delays in the trial process upon the ability of child witnesses to provide a clear and
detailed accouot of their recollections will be minimised (Dixon, 1994a; Cashmore,
1990). Although this is, once again, a credible concern, there are additional - albeit

unintended - effects on the defendant.

The use of video technology is addressed by sections 1061 - 106M of The Act,
allowing for the admission - in Schedule 7 proceedings - of video-taped statements,
video-recorded evidence in chief and/or video-recorded evidence taken at a pre-trial
hearing. Applications uoderthese sections must be initiated by the prosecution (s. 1061
(1]) and, in response, the Judge determines the procedure to be followed in taking the
evidence, presenting the recording, and excising matters from the recording, as well as

the manner in which any cross-examination or re-examination of the affected child is
to be conducted at the trial (s. 106J).

The use of video technology has been opposed on the basis that it interferes with
the right of the defendant to confront prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court of
California has outlined four objectives which the United States' Constitutional right to

confront witnesses is intended to achieve, namely:
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•

to ensure that the evidence is presented under oath;

•

to ensure that the jury have the ability to assess the demeanour of the witness;

•

to facilitate direct face~to-face confrontation~ and

•

to provide the defendant with the opportunity to effectively cross-examine his or
her accuser.

(Bayardi, 1990)

In response to these concerns, video technology does not affect the ability to detect

whether the evidence is given on oath, provided that the taking of the oath (or
affinnation) forms part of the recording. Similarly the demeanour of the witness can he

assessed, as the witness must remain visible throughout the duration of the recording.
This may, however, he affected where the technical quality of the recording is such that
it distorts or fails to convey the appropriate tone of the evidence, affecting the ability
of the jury to assess the credibility of the witness (Rayner, 1991, p. 63). The
detennination of the extent to which the quality of the recording must he affected before
it is deemed unsatisfactory remains arbitrary- firstly because there appears to have been

no research conducted on this issue, and secondly because it is not specifically
addressed under the current legislation.

As has already been established, our Australian legal tradition does not recognise

the absolute right to face-to-face confrontation of witnesses. Although the defendant is,
in the normal court hearing, able to confront their accuser face-to-face, this has occurred
in the absence oflegislation to the contrary mther than in recognition of a specific right
to do so. This objection has no~ therefore, been considered defensible with regard to the
provisions ofThe Act Interestingly, the right of the defendant to be present throughout
the trial has been stipulated in international human rights agreements (for example, in
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Article 14[4] of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), however these
documents faJI short of providing an adequate definition of this requirement. The fact

that the defendant's "presence" continues to be defined or interpreted differently in
various jurisdictions is indicative of the ambiguous nature of this phrase. whereby
Western Australia now deems the defendant to he present even when they are located

in a specified area outside of the actual courtroom, a situation which is, at best,
intuitively uncomfortable.

Another concern lies with the ability of the defence to cross-examine the child
witness effectively. This has, to a degree, been addressed by the amended legislation:

because a video-taped statement does not substitute for the child's appearance at trial,
the child must he available during the trial for cross-examination. Similarly, where the

evidence-in--chief is video-recorded, the child must still be available in court for crossexamination and re-examination. Alternatively, however, aJiowance has been made for
the whole of a child's evidence to he taken at a special video-recorded pre-trial hearing,
and for that video-recording to be presented in lieu of the child's appearance (s. 106K
[4]). The pre-trial hearing may take place at any time prior to the trial, and is attended
only by those persons whose presence is authorised by the Judge (s. 106K (I]).
Defendants are held in a room separate from where the hearing is conducted, although

they are able to observe the proceedings via closed circuit television. Thus they are
forced to communicate with their legal representatives from a remote location.
Furthermore, if they are unrepresented, they have to attempt to conduct their own
defence from this location. Although they wiJI be provided with the means to

communicate with a mediator in such circumstances, their level of control over their
own cross-examination is, at least pntentially, affected. For example, research indicates
that defence counsel who utilise closed circuit television to examine a child situated in
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a remote location find this requirement less daunting as they gain experience (ALRC,
1992, p. 142); unrepresented defendants do not receive the opportunity to gain such
experience prior to their trials. Although the court-appointed mediator may be
experienced in such procedures, they are constrained by Section 106G (b) of The Act
to merely repeat the defendants questions to the witness. Whether these circumstances
are sufficient to affect the defendants ability to cross-examine witnesses effectively is
open to conjecture.

A final objection is that The Act does not incorporate or mandate any explanation
to the jury as to why the evidence of this particular witness (that is, the "affected" child)
is being presented in a different format to that of other witnesses. Deviation from

standard procedure allows speculation which, in itself, could be construed as potentially
prejudicial. Warner (1988) states that conflicting views have been expressed as to
whether presentation of evidence by video ~ whether this be a pre-recorded video or

closed circuit television - actually increases or decreases the impact of the evidence on
the jury (cf. Cashmore, 1990; ALRC, 1992, pp. 139-140). While she concludes that

concern over the prejudicial impact of video evidence "merely reflects a mistrust of
juries and is an insufficient reason for rejecting the procedure" (Warner, 1988), this
represents an inappropriate disregard for a very legitimate concern. Although there is

a lack of conclusive proof demonstrating that video-recorded evidence has a prejudicial

impact on juries, this is an insufficient basis from which to defend the implementation
of legislative reform. This is particularly so when there is a similar lack of proof to

suggest that such evidence may be presented without inducing a prejudicial outcome.
The effect of video evidence on the jury requires more detailed investigation.lfthe use
of such technology can be demonstrated as in any way prejudicial to the interests of the

accused, its utilisation must be re-evaluated.
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While there are certainly less concerns where the videotape is presented in addition
to the child giving evidence during the trial (Rayner, 1991, p. 63), any ensuing cross-

examination or re-examination would undoubtedly take place in accordance with the

procedures allowing for the utilisation of closed circuit television and screening
(outlined above), thus the objections raised with regard to these procedures remain

relevant. Where the child is not made available at the trial for

cross~examination,

however, the recording becomes the sole means through which the jury evaluate the
evidence of the child witness, effectively negating any opportunity to overcome the

problems associated with video evidence.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS OF THE LEGISLATION

The concerns raised in the previous chapter are illusbative of the fact that The Act
has had a significant impact on the trial procedure for specified offences. Although
drafted with the need for procedural fairness in mind, The Act has, in some areas,
redefined this notion of fairness with respect to the offences which fall under the scope
of the legislation. Although many of the concerns outlined are not intended to

demonstrate in themselves that the defendant no longer receives a fair trial, they
exemplify a number of situations in which the defendant is subjected to potentially
prejudicial treatment. Furthermore, when these individual concerns are grouped and
reviewed together they provide strong evidence of inequality before the law. The Act
has effectively ensured that, in trials where the provisions of the legislation are
applicable, the rights of the defendant are construed differently than are the rights of the

defendant in other cases. This overt inequality is certainly somewhat difficult to

reconcile with the notion of fairness.

Equality and Benign Discrimination

Equality 11may be construed as consistency of practice relative to any political
values" (Margolis, 1978). The principle of equality before the law is explicitly
recogoised in both the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (Article 7) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14). Similarly, the
Commonwealth Human Rights Commission expressly states that all people have the
right to equal treatment under the law (Human Rights Commission, 1983, p. 2).
Although, however, the concept of equality before the law is strongly embedded in
Anglo-Australian legal tradition, the practical reality is that not all classes of people are
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afforded equal treatment (Phillipps, 1987, p. 191). As explained by Evans (1974) the
notion of equality is "rhetoric, not law. With the exception of a handful of federal
constitutional provisions of limited scope prohibiting discrimination as between the
States, there are no constraints on the ability ofthe Australian legislature to discriminate
for or against whomsoever it pleases". Whether the legislature should hold such
(virtually unlimited) power is questionable, particularly in light of the concerns, raised
earlier, regarding the inadequacies of current accountability procedures for ensuring the
legislature gives adequate regard to various human rights.

There has been increasing international recognition tbat equality before the law
does not necessarily result in equality in fact: to "obtain equality in fact, it may be
necessary for some people to be given favourable treatment unavailable to others 11

(O'Neill & Handley, 1994, p. 387). This is described by Evans (1974) as "benign
discrimination~~

- "the singling out by the state of a designated group for more

favourable treatment than is accorded to others". He suggests that the fundamental
concern with benign discrimination is how such treatment may be reconciled with the
principle of equality.

Justifications for benign discrimination are usually argned from the perspective that
exact "like" treatment is unnecessary, rather "people should be treated alike to the extent
that they are alike. Different treatment is appropriate when, but only when, there are
relevant differences" (Evans, 1974 ). The introduction of this idea of "relevant
differences", however, makes a .subjective evalUation of the need to apply either

standard or preferential treatment to a givon class of person unavoidable. Two important
questions this raises are: firstly, what criteria are to be employed in making this
determination; and secondly, to what extent is it permissible to accept that, in seeking
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to promote the equality of one group, the preferential treatment extended to that group
impacts adversely on another?

With this latter concern in mind, Evans ( 1974) suggests that opposition to benign
discrimination arises from two sources. Firstly. the non-recipient of favourable
treatment may object for reasons of prejudice, self-interest, or envy. With respect to the
provisions of The Act, the non-recipient could be viewed as either the defendant upon
whom the provisions impact, or other classes of witness who do not receive such
preferential treatment. The second source of objection arises from people who have no
direct or immediate involvement in the proceedings who may raise an objection,

"founded on genuine egalitarian beliefs, that there is something wrong in principle about
any program which treats persons other than exactly alike" (Evans, 1974). It is this
perspective which emphasises the difficulties in reconciling the beneficial and

prejudicial aspects of so-called "benign" discrimination.

If, in accordance with the definition of equality offered by Margolis (above), the
notion of a fair trial is construed as a political value, then the principle of equality
would demand that the notion of fairness be consistently applied. Accordingly,
procedural fairness, when viewed from the perspective of the defendant, would demand
that defendants receive consistent treatment. Although intended to address the apparent
difficulties and inequalities children face when they become involved in the legal
process, The Act has achieved this at the expense of adequate considemtion of the
defendanfs claims to equality. In extending preferential treatment to the child witness,
the unavoidable consequence is that defendants become differentiated on the basis of
their alleged offence: the procedure applied during the trial of the defendant charged,
for example, with child sexual abuse is not consistent with that applied in a trial where
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the provisions of The Act do not apply. Thus in this situation defendants affected by this
legislation appear to have a legitimate objection - albeit based on self-interest - that, in
relation to other defendants, they are not receiving equitable treatment. Perhaps the
most disturbing aspect of such differentiation is that, at the time the procedural
differences are applied, the guilt or innocence of the defendant has not been established.
From this perspective, it is difficult to justifY why one defendant should not be afforded
the same considemtion as another. This is a fundamental objection which should be of
concern to anyone who perceives a need for procedural fairness to be founded on equal
treatment.
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CONCLUSION

Balancing competing interests in a criminal trial is both a complex and contentious
issue. When a child is involved as a witness in the trial process, the incompatibilities
between the rights and needs of opposing parties are seemingly magnified The interests
ofjustice, however, require that an appropriate balance be struck between these rights.
As explained by Bates (1992), it is equally unacceptable either for unsubstantiated
allegations of child abuse to be upheld, or for offenders not to be brought to justice for
their actions. However, as Underwager (1989) asserts, whenever we endeavour to
decrease the occurrence of a specified behaviour or outcome, there is an increased risk
of "erring on the other side". Thus, if we focus on the introduction of measures to
facilitate the successful conviction of child abusers, we may also increase the risk of

wrongful conviction. For this reason, the rights of both victim and defendant must be
adequately addressed.

The psychological evidence upon which the provisions of the Acts Amendment
(Evidence of Children and Others) Act /992 were based is compelling. Traditional

beliefs regarding the inherent unreliability of children's evidence have been
demonstrated to be unfounded, necessitating the reform oflegislation pertaining to the
competency and corroboration requirements applied to child witnesses. To the extent

that the provisions of The Act have addressed this issue, bringing children into line with
other witnesses, there is no perceptible impact on the rights of the defendant.

Certain provisions ofThe Act have, however, introduced procedural changes which
are at least potentially prejudicial to the accused. These include the subtle erosion of the
presumption of innocellce and a degree of interference with the ability of the defence
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to cross-examine witnesses effectively. Furthermore, the legislation has resulted in the
unequal treatment of accused persons involved in trials which fall under the scope of
The Act when compared with accused persons facing other criminal charges.
Differentiation on the basis of the defendanfs alleged offence is inconsistent with the
concept of equality before the law, which is strongly embedded in Anglo-Australian
legal tradition.

Through our c,ommon law traditions, the right to a fair trial is established as a
central precept of Austrnlia's legal system. In the Hohfeldian sense of a claim right, if
a defendant has the right to a fair trial, then there is a corresponding duty placed on the
legislators, administrators and practitioners - who have the ability to impact on and
regulate the judicial process - to ensure that this right is upheld. Although laying claim
to protecting the defendanfs right to a fair trial, The Act has focused exclusively on the
needs of the child witness. Whilst based on legitimate concerns to minimise the trauma
experienced by the child and to facilitate the reception of their evidence, the effect of
the legislation has been a perceptible shift in the balance of competing interests in the
criminal trial, whereby the interests of the defendant are not always adequately
safeguarded.

Although no single provision of The Act is necessarily sufficiently prejudicial to
the accused to negate the right to a fair trial, when the provisions are considered in total
there is a tangible effect on this right. This is incompatible with the understanding that
the right to a fair trial, extraneous to the resolution of the dispute in question, holds
priority over the pragmatic aim of the determination of troth (Uglow, n.d.; Ligertwood,
1993, p. 538). Thus the discrimination inherent in The Act is most certainly not benign.
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This thesis has emphasised the areas of potential incompatibility between The Act
and defendants' rights. The extent to which this potential prejudicial effect engenders
an actual prejudicial outcome has not been addressed. Thus future research must be
conducted to explore the actual (not perceived) impact of The Act on all parties to the
proceedings, including the defendant, the child, defence and prosecution lawyers,
judicial officers and jurors. Subsequent to this investigation, a re-evaluation of the
legitimacy of the legislation may be required.
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APPENDIX!

Evidence Act 1906 (WA): Section 101 (Since repealed)
101.

(I)

In any civil or criminal proceeding, or in any inquiry

or examination in any court, or before any person acting judicially,
where any child who has not attained the age of 12 years is tepdered
as a witness and does not in the opinion of the court, or person
acting judicially, understand the nature of an oath, the evidence of
such child may be received, though not given upon oath, if in the
opinion of the court, or person acting judicially, such child is
possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the
evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth.
(2)

No person shall be convicted of any crime or

misdemeanour on the testimony of a child who gives evidence under
the provisions of this section unless the testimony of such child is
corroborated by other evidence in some material particular.
(3)
Any witness whose evidence has been admitted under
this section shall be liable to indicttnent and punishment for peJjury
in all respects as if he or she had been sworn.
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APPENDIXl
Acts Amendment (Evidence of Chadren and Others) Act 1992 (WA)

Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and
Others) Act 1992

[No. 36

PART 2- EVIDENCE ACT 1906

Principal Act
3. In this Part the Evidence Act 1906* is referred to as the
principal Act.
[• Reprinted as at 14 August 1986.
For subsequent amendments see 1990 Index to
Legislation of Western Australia p. 52 and Act No. 15
ofl991.]

Section 35 amended
4. Section 35 of the principal Act is amended by repealing
subsection (2).
Section 50 amended
5. Section 50 of the principal Act is amended by repealing
subsection (3).
Section lOOA amended
6. Section lOOA of the principal Act is amended by inserting
after subsection (5) the following subsections -

•

(6)

References in this section to (a)

a person who is tendered as a witnessj or

(b)

a person who desires to lay a complaint or
information,

extend to a child who is of or over the age of 12 years
and who is tendered as a witness or who desires to lay

•. 3
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a complaint or information; and the provisions of thle
section have effect accordingly.
(7) Except ae provided in subsection (6), this
section does not apply to a child, ae defined in section
106A.

•

Section 101 repealed
7.

Section 101 of the principal Act is repealed.

Heading and sections 106A to 1068 inserted
8.

Atier section 106 of the principal Act, the following heading

and sections are inserted -

"

Evidence of Children and Special Witnesses
Interpretation
1n sections 106B to 1068 and in Schedule 7,
unless the contrary intention appears -

106A.

"affected child" means (a)

in relation to an application referred
to in clause 2 of Part A of Schedule 7,
the child In respect of whom the
application is made;

(b)

in relation to any other Schedule 7
proceeding, the child upon or in
respect of whom it is alleged that an
offence was committed, attempted or
proposed;

"child" means -

(a)

aoy boy or girl under the age of 18
years;
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(b) . in the absence of positive evidence as

to ago, any boy or girl apparently
under the ago of 18 years; and
·(c)

in any proceeding in the Children's
Court, any boy or girl dealt with
under section 19 (2) of the Children's
Court of Western Australia Act 1988;

"counsel" includes a solicitor;

"defendant" -

(a) · in relation to an application referred
to in clause 2 of Part A of
Schedule 7(i)

means any party to
proceeding, other than

the
the

affected child and an applicant
who is a police officer or an
officer of the Department for
Community Services;
(ii)

(b)

in sections 106K (3) (e) and
106N as they apply to such an
application means any such
party specified by the Judgo;

in relation to any other Schedule 7
proceeding, a person complained
against for an offence;

"proceeding" means any civil or criminal
proceeding or any examination in any
Court or before any person acting
judicially, and includes a preliminary
hearing under the Justices Act 1902 and a
pre-trial hearing under section 106K;

75

No. 36]

s. 8

Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and
Others) Act 1992
"prosecutor", . in relation to an application

referred to in clause 2 of Part A of
Schedule 7, means the applicant in that
application;
"Schedule 7 proceeding" means a proceeding
that. comes within the provisions of
Schedule 7;
"trial", in relation to an application referred to

in clause 2 of Part A of Schedule 7, means
the hearing of that application;
"video-taped recording" means any recording
on any medium from which a moving image
may be produced by any means, and

includes the accompanying sound track.
Sworn evidence of children

106B.

(1)

A child who is under the age of 12 years
may in any proceeding, if the child is competent under
subsection (2), give evidence on oath under section 97

(3) or after making a solemn aff'U'Dlation under section
97 (4).

.

(2) A child who is under the age of 12 years is
competent to take an oath or make a solemn
affirmation if in the opinion of the Court or person
acting judicially the child understands that (a)

the giving of evidence is
matter; and

a serious

(b)

he or she in glVlng evidence has an
obligation to tell.the truth that is over and
above the ordinary duty to tell the truth.
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Unsworn evidence of children
106C. A child under the age of 12 years who is not
competent to give evidence under section 106B may
give evidence without taking any oath or making a
solemn affirmation if the Court or person acting
judicially forms the opinion, before the evidence is
given, that the child is able to give an intelligible
account of events which he or she has observed or
experienced.
Particular form of corroboration warning
not to be given
106D. In any proceeding on indictment for an
offence in which evidence is given by a child, tbe
Judge is not to warn the jury, or suggest to the jury in
any way, that it is unsafe to convict on the
uncorroborated evidence of that child because children
are classified by the law as unreliable witnesses.

Support for child witness
106E. (1) A child who is under the age of 16 years
is entitled, while he or she is giving evidence in any
proceeding in a Court, to have near to him or her a
person who may provide the child with support.
(2) The person referred to in subsection (1) is to
be approved by the Court and is not to be a person
who is a witness in or a party to the proceeding.

s. a
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Assistance in communicating questions and
evidence

106F. (1) Where a child under the age of 16 years
is to give evidence in any proceeding in a Court, the
Court may appoint a person that it considers suitable
and competent to act as a communicator for the child.
(2) The function of a person appointed under this
section is, if requested by the Judge, to communicate
and explain -

(a)

to the child questions put to the child; and

(b)

to the Court, the evidence given by the

child.
(3) A person appointed under this section is to
take an oath or make a declaration, in such form as
the Court thinks fit, that he or she will faithfully
perform his or her function under subsection (2).
(4) A person appointed under this section who,
while perfol1Iling or purportedly perfonning his or her
function under subsection (2), wilfully makes any false
or misleading statement to the child or to the Court
commits. an indictable offence and is liable on
conviction to imprisonment for 5 years.
Cros~exam.ination

by unrepresented defendant

166G. Where in any proceeding for an offence a
defendant who is not represented by counsel wishes to
cross~examine a child who is under 16 years of age,
the defendant (a)

is not entitled to do so directlyi but

(b)

may put any question to the child by
stating the question to the Judge or a
person approved by the Court,
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and that person is to repeat the question accurately to

the child.
Admission of child's statement in
proceeding for sexual offences, etc.

106H. (1) In any Schedule 7 proceeding, a
relevant statement may, at the discretion of the
Judge, be admitted in evidence i f (a)

there has been given to the defendant (i)

a copy of the statement; or

(ii)

if the statement is not recorded in

writing or electromcally, details of the
statement; and

the defendant is given the opportunity to
cross..examine the affected child.

(b)

Subsection (1) does not affect the operation

(2)

of(a)

section 106G; or

(b)

section 69 of the Justices Act 1902, other
than subsection (1) of that section.

(3)

In subsection (1) "relevant statement"

means a statement that -

(a)

relates to any matter in issue in the
proceeding; and

(b)

was made by the affected child to another
person before the proceeding was
commenced,
·

whether the statement is recorded in writing or
electromcally or not.

s.S

•
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Video-taping of child's evidence,
application for directions

1061. (1) Where any Schedule 7 proceeding has
been commenced in a Court, the prosecutor may apply
to a Judge of that Court for an ordar directing (a)

that the affected child's evidence in chief be
taken, in whole or in part, and :Presented to
the Court in the form of a video-taped
recording of oral evidence given by the
affected child; or

(b)

that the affected child's evidence be taken
at a pre-trial hearing.

(2) The defendant is to be served with a copy of,
and is entitled to be heard on, an application under
subsection (1).
Giving of evidence by video-tape

106J. (1) A Judge who hears an application under
section 1061 (1) (a) may make such order as the Judge
thinks fit which may include directions as to (a)

the procedure to be followed in the taking
of the evidence, the presentation of the
recording and the excision of matters from
it; and

(b)

the manner in which any croas-examination
or re-examination of the affected child is to
be conducted at the trial.

(2) An order under subsection (1) may be varied
or revoked.
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Giving of evidence at pre-trial hearing
106K. (1) . A Judge who hears an application under
section 106I (1) (b) may make such order ss the Judge
thinks fit which is to include directions ss to the
persons who may be present at the pre-trial hearing.
(2) An order under subsection (1) may be varied
or revoked.
(3) At a pre-trial
subsection(!)-

hearing

ordered

under

(a)

no person other than a person authorized
by the Judge under subsection (1) is to be
present at the hearing;

(b)

subject to the control of the presiding
Judge, the affected child is to give his or
her evidence and be examined and cross-

examined;
(c)
(d)

except ss provided by this section, the
usual rules of evidence apply;
the proceedings are to be recordod on videotape;

(e)

the defendant is to be in a room separate
from the room in which the hearing is held
but is to be capable of observing the
proceedings by means of a closed circuit
television system.

(4) The affected child's evidence at the trial is to
be given by the presentation to the Court of the
recording made under subsection (3), and the affacted
child need not be present at the trial.

.•. 8
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(5) \Vhere circumstances eo require, more than
one pre-trial hearing may he held under this section
for the purpose of taking the evidence of the affected
child, and section 1061 and this section are to be read
with all changes necessary to give effect to any such

requirement.

Status of video-taped evidence

106L. A presentation to a Court of video-taped
evidence under section 106H, 106J or 106K is
admissible as if the evidence were given orally in the
proceeding in accordance with the usual rules and
practice of that Court.
Recording not to be altered without approval
106M. (1) The original recording of video-taped
evidence made at a pre-trial hearing under section
106K for the purposes of a trial is not to he edited or
altered in any way without the approval of a Judge
before it is presented to the Court at the trial.

(2) A video-taped recordiog that is edited or
altered contrary to subsection (1) is inadmissible in
evidence at the trial for which it was made.
(3) In subsection (1) "Judge" means the Judge
who presided at the pre-trial hearing or a Judge who
has jurisdiction co-extensive with that Judge.
Use of closed circuit television
or screening arrangements

106N.
(a)

(1)

This section -

applies only to a Schedule 7 proceeding, but
subject to any order under section 1060;
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(b)

is to operate only to the extent that the
giving of evidence by the affected child is
not provided for by an order under section
106K; and

(c)

has effect notwithstanding section 635 of
The Criminal Code.

(2)

Where the necessary facilities and equipment

are available one of the following arrangements is to

be made by the Judge for the giving of evidence by the
affected child (a)

he or she is to give evidence outside the
courtroom but within the court precincts,
and the evidence is to be transmitted to the
courtroom by means of closed circuit
televiaion; or

(b)

while he or she is g1vmg evidence the
defendant is to be held in a room apart
from the courtroom and the evidence is to
be transmitted to that room by mesns of
closed circuit television.

(3) Where subsection (2) (b) applies the defendant
is at all times to have the means of communicating
with his or her counsel.
(4) Where the necessary facilities and equipment
referred to in subsection (2) are not available, a
screen, one-way glass or other device is to be so placed
in relation to the affected child while he or she is
giving evidence that (a)

the affected
defendant; but

child

cannot

see

the
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(b)

the Judge, the jury (in the case of
proceedings on indictment), the defendant
and his or her counsel can see the affected
child.

Order that section 106N does not apply
1060. (1) Where any Schedule 7 proceeding has
been commenced in a Court the prosecutor may apply
to a Judge of that Court for an order that section
106N does not apply to those proceedings.
(2) A Judge who hears an application under
subsection (1) may grant the application if it is shown
to the Judge's satisfaction that the affected child is
able and wishes to give evidence iu the presence of the
defendant in the courtroom or other room in which the
proceedings are being held.
(3) An order under subsection (2) may be varied
or revoked.
Instructions to be given to jury
106P. Where in any proceeding on indictment
evidence of an affected c:hild is given in a manner
described in section 106N (2) or (4), the Judge is to
instruct the jury that the procedure is a routine

practice of the Court and that they should not draw
any inference as to the defendant's guilt from the use
of the procedure.
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Identification of defendant
106Q, Where evidence of an affected child is given
in a manner described io section 106N (2) or (4), and
the identification of the defendant is an issue, the
affected child is not to be required to be io the
presence of the defendant for that purpose (a)

for any longer than is necessary for that
purpose; and

(b)

before the affected child's evidence
(including cross-examination and reexamination) is completed.

Persons may¢ be declared special witnesses

106R. (1)
order-

A Judge of a Court may make an

(a)

declaring that a person who is giving, or is
to give, evidence in any proceeding in that
Court is a special witness;

(b)

directing that one or more of the
arrangements referred to io subsection (4)
are to be made for the giving of that
evidence; and

(c)

providiog for any iocidental or related
matter.

(2) An order may be made under subsection (1) on
application by a party to a proceediog, on notice to the
other parties, or of the Court's own motion.
(3) The grounds on which an order may be made
are that if the person is not treated as a special
witness he or she would, in the Court's opinion -

36
•. 8

85

No. 36]

s. 8

Acts Ame>tdment (Evidence of Children and
Others) Act 1992
(a)

by read.on of mental or phyeical disability,
be unlikely to be able to give evidence, or to
give ~dence satisfactorily; or

(b)

be likely (i)
(ii)

to suffer severe emotional trauma; or

to be so intimidated or distressed as
to be unable to give evidence or to

give evidence satisfactorily,
by reason of age, cultural background,
relationship to any party to the proceeding,
the nature of the subject-matter of the
evidence, or any other factor that the Court
considers relevant.
(4) The arrangements that may be made under
this section are (a)

· (b)

that the person have near to him or her a
peraon, approved by the Court, who may
provide him or her with support;
in any proceeding for an ofFence -

(i)

that an arrangement of the kind
described in section 106N (2) or (4) is
to be made; and

(ii)

that the evidence be given at a pretrial hearing in the manner provided
for by section 106K.

(5) The Court may at any time vary or revoke an
order in force under this section.
(6)

child.

This section does not apply to an afFected
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Pre-trial hearings to consider
what orders should be made

1068.

(1)

In any proceeding in which-

(a)

the giving of evidence by a person; or

(b)

a matter affecting a person as a witness,

is likely to require the making of an order or the
giving of directions under sections 106E (2), 106F (1),
106J, 106K, 1060, or 106R, the party who is to call
that person as a witness is to apply for a pre-trial
hearing for the purpose of having all such matters
dealt with before the trial.

(2) In subsection (1) "pre-trial hearing" in
relation to a Court means a hearing provided for by
rules of that Court for the purposes of this section.

"

Section 119 amended

9.

Section 119 (2) of the principal Act is amended (a)

by deleting the full stop at the end of the subsection
and substituting the following -

"
(b)

; and

";and

by inserting after paragraph (b) the following-

"

(c)

persons
106F.

appointed

under

section

"

Schedule 7 added

10. After Schedule 6 to the principaJ Act, · the following
Schedule is added -
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SCHEDULE7

"

(section 106A)
PART A

1. A proceeding comes within the provisions of tllls
Schedule if(a)

it is a proceeding in which a person stands
charged with an offence under a section or
Chapter of The Criminal Code mentioned in

PartBorC(i)

whether as a single offence or together
with any other offence as an additional or
alternative count; and

(ii)

whether or not the person is liable on the
charge to be found guilty of any other

offence; and
(b)

the affected child was under the age of 16 years
on the day on which the complaint of the
offence was made or, in the case of an
indictment under section 579 of The Criminal
Code, on the day on which the indictment was

presented; and
(c) ·

in the case of a proceeding for an offence
mentioned in Part C, the defendant is a person
to whom this paragraph applies.

2. A proceeding also comes within the provisions of this
Schedule if it is an application under section 30 of the
Child Welfare Act 1947 for a declaration that a child is in

need of care and protection.
3, A proceeding also comes within the provisions of this
Schedule if it is a procseding by way of appeal from a
decision made, or a penalty imposed, in any proceeding that
comes within clause 1 or 2.
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Paragraph {c) of clause 1 applies to -

(a).

a

parent,

step-parent,

grandparent,

step-

grandparent, brother, sister, step-brother, step·

sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the
complainant and a child of any uncle or aunt of
the complainant;
(b)

a person who is or was, at the time when the
offence was committed, living in the same
household as the complainant; or

(c)

a person who at any time had the care of, or
exercised authority over, the child in the
household on a regular basis,

and it is immaterial whether a relationship referred to in
parag;raph (a) is of the whole blood or of the half blood.

PARTB

Chapter or
Section

Matter to which Chapter or section
relates

181

Carnal knowledge of animal

184

Indecent practices between males in·
public

186

Occupier or owner allowing certain
persons to be on premises for
unlawful carnal knowledge

191

Procuration

192

Procuring person to have unlawful
carnal knowledge by threats, fraud,
or administering drugs

195

Permitting
brothels

XXXI

Sexual offences

boys

to

resort

to
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PARTC

Chapter or section

Matter to which Chapter or
section relates

XXVIII

Homicide; suicide; concealment of
birth

292

Disabling in order
indictable offence

293

Stupefying in order to commit

to

commit

indictable offence

294

Acts intended to cause grievous
bodily harm or prevent arrest

294A

Dangerous goods on aircraft

297

Grievous bodily harm

296

Causing

explosion

likely

to

endanger life

299

Attempting to cause
likely to endanger life

300

Maliciously administering poison
with intent to harm

301

Wounding and similar acts

302

Failure

304

Endangering life of children by
exposure

306

Negligent acts causing harm

313

Common assaults

317

AssaUlts occasioning bodily harm

explosion

to supply necessaries
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Part C- continued
Chapter· or section

Matter to which Chapter or
section relates

318

Serious assaults

332

Kidnapping

333

Deprivation of liberty

347

Child stealing

I

"

